Political parties can eventually become old, weak and vulnerable, just as individual people do. Neither Republicans nor Democrats spark among their followers the energy and enthusiasm that they once did. In 1996 the Republicans had good reason to feel tired and discouraged: they had lost the previous Presidential election to the Democrats, and the current GOP candidate, Bob Dole was experienced, respected, but also old and tired. Using the code words "Family Values," the Republicans were attempting to appeal to a resentful, reactionary constituency.
The Republicans had taken care in the previous four years to maintain their claim on conservative political turf. But as the Democrats slouched further right themselves, the line between the two established parties became blurred. It was all very well for the GOP to castigate Clinton for being a dangerous liberal, but in fact the President was backing away from liberal ideas. It was the kind of political landscape in which George Wallace had many years earlier declared that there was "not a dime's worth of difference" between the Republican and Democratic parties.
Since 1992 the anti-abortion activists had been brewing up sustained political agitation. While the Republicans had been content to do legislative maneuvering for "Family Values," the antis had been out on the streets doing something. And the object of their activities was often much more than voting. They worked out their own versions of the methods of civil rights and anti-war protesters. They were able to bring thousands of energetic followers out onto the streets to insist on their cause. These young rebels disdained waiting for a slow legislative solution -- they moved masses of people on the street to enforce their political will.
The Republicans hoped to capture the energy of these new activists and divert it to serve the interests of the Tired Old Party. For their part, the activists longed to get their hands on the levers of power in the GOP. Never did two sets of opportunists more deserve each other. In the end, the Republicans were more naive than their new recruits. The GOP pols believed they could prevail on the reactionaries graciously to accept some crumbs from the eventual victory banquet as their reward. In this they counted on observing the patronage traditions of both the established political parties -- if you're faithful to us, we give you goodies later on.
Instead the new single-issue invitees, the anti-abortion crusaders, entered the party remaining much more deeply loyal to their original cause than to the interests of the Republicans. This new blood element was able to stay energized and organized as its own self, even while within the party. Eventually they could insist vehemently on a loyalty test: that all GOP candidates should adhere to a plank in the party platform explicitly condemning abortion. When Presidential nominee Bob Dole resisted this push, the new faction showed him considerable disrespect, marking the first time that a party nominated and then bitchslapped a candidate.
For a moment it was as if the GOP had forgotten its most basic constituency: established money and power. Of the two parties, the Republicans are more clearly tied to the idea that the wealth and privilege of a few is the basis for prosperity for all. How must the centers of finance capital and multinational coroporations have viewed their party's recent adventures? The right-wing social activists, especially the anti-abortion crusaders put their central message right out on the surface: America must return to God's will, believers must rise in holy revolt against evil. What might that mean for financial markets? If the unrighteous are cast into a lake of fire, would that destabilize the Federal Reserve?
If the religious extremists actually could begin to exert substantial power, their influence on markets would be the equivalent of gambling or wildcat oildrilling -- the rule of unreasoning and self-destructive enthusiasm. Eschatology is no basis for a state that must sustain the equilibrium for predictable and controllable development.
The Republican Convention of the year 2000 was well tuned to prevent embarrassment. TV and radio commentators remarked that the delegates had little to do, other than to be the audience and cheering section. Ever the experts at Rules of Order and parliamentary organization, the GOP set up a convention where there was no opportunity for rancorous debate or surprise attacks led by energetic cliques. Everything was settled beforehand.
Meanwhile the stock of the religious extremists had fallen considerably since the 1996 election. The anti-abortion leaders had originally been able to summon crowds in the thousands to their "rescues" and "lock and blocks". But within a few years' time, they could turn out only tens or hundreds at best to any action that involves defying the law. There are several reasons for this turn of fortunes, the most prominent being their theory of leadership, Leaderless Resistance, which requires leaders to operate from hiding, while expecting followers to carry out the tasks and take the consequences. There is besides an ever-widening split between the street activists on the one hand (Missionaries to the Preborn, Missionaries to the Unborn, Operation Save America) and the churches, foundations, institutions, publishing houses, radio and tv stations on the other hand. This conflict is shown in some detail on the page The Cheering Section.
An essay by Fred Wallace
